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Security Information

Official Diary

Friday, 29 August 1952

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1. At the Deputies' meeting, pointed out the explosive nature of a proposed psychological warfare operation directed at [REDACTED] and the DCI instructed [REDACTED] to withdraw all CIA participation.

2. Recommended that the Director include in the President's book the O/RR study on the Soviet Five-Year Plan.

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3. Complained to the Director that CIA did not include in its Report for the President information respecting negotiations in Iran because, regardless of what may have been given the Director, O/CI had not received the cables from State. The Director undertook to speak to Undersecretary Bruce about this, but later apparently complained to [REDACTED] 25X1A9a later called back and stated that CIA had received all cables on these negotiations save those exchanged between the Chiefs of State. I then spoke to the Director and said that such cables had been flowing in rather fast after his talk with [REDACTED] and I felt that the statement was incorrect, since CIA did not receive the cable giving the proposal made to Mossadeq. The Director had no illusions as to this point. He said that there was no need for me to give him a written report on the incident, but desired me to carry on with [REDACTED] 25X1A9a and I shall do so on Tuesday. Later informed [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] office that [REDACTED] initial statement had been incorrect and requested him to do what he could on Saturday to obtain particularly the cable giving the proposal made to Mossadeq. He undertook to do so. I also spoke to Mr. Dulles and requested him to speak to Undersecretary Bruce, since the real key to this problem lay in the Secretary's Secretariat which was not subject to the State Intelligence Office jurisdiction. Also requested O/CI to give me some briefing notes for Mr. Dulles' talk with Undersecretary Bruce.

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4. At the Deputies' meeting, the Director announced that Secretary Pace would be here for luncheon next Friday and would give a 30 or 40-minute talk, following the luncheon, in the conference room. I arranged with [REDACTED] to have ten representatives from the Intelligence Offices present. These should include members of O/NE Board and appropriate representatives of other interested offices.

5. At the Deputies' meeting, Gen. Smith indicated disagreement with some of the recent reports on the Russian reorganization, and particularly the problem of succession. He felt that the reorganization would limit, rather than increase, the power of the Secretariat and Malenkov, since the Presidium would take unto itself some of the problems which the Secretariat had been handling. He also felt strongly that no real decision had been reached and the three who would probably go along in an uneasy triumvirate

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were Molotov (foreign policy), Malenkov (party) and Beria (security), the last named being the key to the situation, because the man to whom he threw his strength would likely prevail.

6. Attended PRC meeting.

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7. Chatted with [REDACTED] respecting his reactions on O/SI. He made the very interesting suggestion that two or three people in NED be relieved, so far as possible, of administrative responsibilities, so as to enable them to concentrate on planning and exploitation of intelligence. This seemed to me to conform closely with the basic idea under which the Intelligence Staff had been created in O/CI and this had been a most successful arrangement. I indicated interest in it and requested [REDACTED] to prepare some recommendations which we can discuss next Friday, when he is coming in to see me at 5 P.M. [REDACTED] also indicated that he was somewhat broadening the scope of questions he was asking and I assured him that I understood what he was doing and approved of his being informed.

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8. [REDACTED] of O/CI suggested that [REDACTED] might be of some value as an adviser on technical intelligence, since he had been a specialist on this point in Europe. I consulted with Gen. Weckerling on this point and he confirmed [REDACTED] view as to [REDACTED] background and capabilities in this particular field. I have done nothing other than to request [REDACTED] to bring this aspect of [REDACTED] to Dr. Chadwell's attention.

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9. Lunched with [REDACTED] at FDD and later visited the various divisions. The two most constant difficulties complained of were relations with O/RR and personnel problems. FDD is conducting a series of seminars with O/RR, and following that I suggested that [REDACTED] and Bob Amory have representatives of the two Offices sit down and see where our problems lay.

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10. The DCI requested me on Tuesday to send a copy of Volume I of the Vulnerability Study to Undersecretary Bruce of State and to inform him that the other studies, which were extremely bulky, would be available if he wished to see them.

11. Expressed to the DCI my view that Mossadeq would not likely agree to any joint offer by the UK and the US, although he might accept a unilateral U.S. offer. The time may be too late for that.

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12. At the suggestion of Mr. Dulles, gave [REDACTED] an extract from the memorandum of our conversation with the D. of J. relating to the [REDACTED] case for forwarding to the [REDACTED] Office, and also had him read the correspondence so that he could appropriately instruct the Office.

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13. Made final arrangements for the briefing of Eisenhower and Stevenson, and with Messrs. [REDACTED] discussed this briefing with the DCI.

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14. Allen Dulles informed me that he had spoken to the DCI respecting [REDACTED] paper, which had been prepared without express authority either from CIA or PSB. I informed the Director of the instructions which I had issued when I found that [REDACTED] was visiting CIA Intelligence Offices, and also informed him that I had made it plain to Dr. Craig that no one had been authorized to take a position on behalf of CIA in speaking to [REDACTED]. When the Director indicated the feeling that [REDACTED] was a person who had to be kept under lock and key, I demurred at being given the task of keeping [REDACTED] under control and expressed the view that it would be best to send him out of town.

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15. Spoke with [REDACTED] of O/CI as to the desirability of a liaison officer with AD/Commo in order to deal with Commo matters. This was occasioned by the fact that I had to complain at the PRC today because a project relating to [REDACTED] had not come to the PRC through DD/I, a routing which Gen. McClelland should have been following. [REDACTED] later informed me that O/CI had designated [REDACTED] as their Commo liaison and I shall phone Gen. McClelland on Tuesday to inform him.

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16. [REDACTED] informed me that [REDACTED] visit to CIA had been postponed until next Friday.

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